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Abstract  
This thesis empirically investigates the bank runs probability cases over the period 
2005-2011 on Russian banking market and, simultaneously, tests the hypothesis of 
influence of bank-fundamental factors and macroeconomic conditions on the 
decision of depositors to withdraw their funds from banks. Methodologically, was 
conducted a logit econometric model to test our assumptions. We find evidence on 
both bank-fundamentals, such as high debt ratio, rising real interest rates, small 
asset size, and macroeconomic conditions, such as high inflation, and sharp 
increases in the real exchange rates, to influence on bank runs. In addition, the 
thesis analyzes the significance of deposit insurance implementation in avoiding 
bank runs. Moreover, we compare if the newly adopted deposit insurance 
diminished the credibility of the depositors in the state-controlled banks compared 
with private banks, thus, increasing the amount of investments to private banks. 
Finally, based on our approach, the method identifies a run on Russian deposit 
market during quarter four of 2008 year; however we would not characterize it as a 
severe run because it did not touch all banks but more as a partial one (approx. 1/3 
of banks from the system were affected).  
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I will rely on a logit econometric model in order to test my hypotheses. By examining over 
900 banks from Russian banking industry,  I am going to demonstrate which factors – 
bank fundamentals or macroeconomics – can lead to a bank run and also if the deposit 
insurance scheme implemeted in 2004 is the first-best optimum in preventing bank runs.  
 
H1: Weak bank-fundamental factors may lead to the withdrawal of depositors from that 
bank, thus causing a bank run phenomena. 
H2: Weak macroeconomic conditions may lead to bank deposit withdrawals from banking 
system of that country. 
H3: The deposit insurance implementation helps avoid exposure to bank runs. 
My research will be focused on testing the probability of bank runs on Russian banking 
system. The most influential theories on bank runs stress that occurrence of bank runs 
can be caused by panic effects (based on Diamond and Dybvig Model, 1983), bank-
fundamental factors, or macroeconomic conditions. Thus, the main aim of this research 
will be studying Russian depositors’ behavior after the implementation of deposit 
insurance scheme in Russia and understanding forces that make depositors to come and 
withdraw their money from bank.  
Also, I will analyze the role deposit insurance policy plays in the performance and stability 
of run-prone Russian banking sector and as well try to test if DIS scheme can have even 
an adverse side effect.  
I will also attempt to empirically verify my model. For the model I am going to use data 
from Central Bank of Russia, World Bank Data Base and other valuable sources on 
Russian market. 
Estimation of Bank Runs probability in the context of Deposit Insurance implementation in 
Russia 
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Bank runs along with the banking crisis are considered to be one of the most 
severe global phenomena during the last decades. A run on a bank might cause 
financial instability and stimulate banking crisis because banks typically hold only a 
fraction of customers’ deposits in cash and a situation of an excessive and unexpected 
deposit withdrawal would threaten bank’s solvency. Moreover, a run on a single bank 
can evolve into runs on the whole banking system, hence causing contagion and 
leading to bank crisis. According to Laeven and Valencia (2007), during 1970-2007 
were identified around 42 bank runs around the globe, including Russia, the country 
of interest in our research. The importance of analysis and prevention of exposure to 
massive deposit withdrawals is additionally confirmed by the current Cyprus 
financial crisis that might lead Europe to a new bank run risk. Consequently, a good 
understanding of the bank runs mechanism is not only crucial for the bank 
supervision, but also important for understanding the recent crisis episodes (Zhu, 
2001). Several techniques have been used by the policymakers during history to 
prevent the effects of bank runs, through the most recent being considered the deposit 
insurance technique. Although deposit insurance policy might guarantee the value of 
capital, it also might imply less monitoring by depositors, which allows banks to hold 
riskier portfolios and cause moral hazard issues. Thereby, an optimal protecting 
policy against banks runs is yet to be found. 
In this thesis, our primary objective is to estimate the underlying driving forces of 
bank runs and answer to the following relevant questions. How and why the 
depositors are determined to run on a bank? Also, we would like to test whether 
deposit insurance implementation helps avoid exposure to bank runs?  
According to the existing literature, most empirical studies distinguish between 
two types of bank runs: information-based bank runs, correlated with the bank 
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fundamentals or macroeconomic fundamentals, and panic-based bank runs in which 
there are no fundamental factors. The panic-based theory is related to the classical 
work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where depositors run to extract their money for 
non-economic reasons, such as herd behavior. However, in this thesis we will focus 
on the second type of bank runs that are expected to happen when bank fundamentals 
and the economy as a whole are in bad state - the information-based bank runs. 
As the country of interest, to test our theories and hypothesis on the depositors’ 
incentives to run on a bank, was selected Russia. For Russia, the estimation of factors 
that may cause a bank run is particularly relevant in the view of the high vulnerability 
of the domestic financial sector. Also, Russian deposit market is an ideal environment 
to test for bank runs in connection with the new law on deposit insurance, 
implemented in 2004. Therefore, in this paper we aim to test for significance of the 
impact of bank-fundamentals and macroeconomic factors on the exposure of Russian 
banking sector to bank runs. Particularly, we are interested in the post-deposit 
implementation period as we would like to examine, also, how Russian depositors 
responded to the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme. Simultaneously, we 
are interested to analyze the evolution of the reliance of depositors on the state-
controlled banking sector as we expect the introduction of deposit insurance to lead to 
a decrease in the amount of deposits in state-controlled banks. 
We consider the analysis of bank run exposure for Russian deposit market an 
important research for future policies improvement. The thesis contributes to the 
economic research in this area by analyzing the banks’ institutional deficiencies, as 
well as the macroeconomic issues that can cause a run on Russian banks. Besides 
testing the factors that may lead to run on Russian banks, this study will also 
investigate the efficiency of deposit insurance as a policy against deposit 
withdrawals. As the most appropriate econometric technique for this purpose was 
selected the logistic regression which allows for a binary outcome, in our case 
presence or absence of a run. 
The thesis is structured as follows. The Chapter 2 comprises the literature review 
on bank runs and deposit insurance conducted so far, as well as a detailed description 
on the main characteristics Russian banking system specifics and the new law on 
deposit insurance. Chapter 3 represents the methodological section where are 
presented the hypothesis aimed to be tested in this research together with a 
description of the applied econometric model. Chapter 4 provides the results and a 
sharp discussion of the empirical results and the explanatory factors that cause bank 
  10 
runs. The concluding remarks are in Chapter 5. The references list and the Appendix 
can be found at the end of the research. 
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2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review on the existing bank runs literature 
mainly focusing on the studies on the determinants of bank runs and the role of 
deposit insurance scheme in preventing deposit withdrawals. Additionally, it includes 
section 2.5 that provides detailed explanation on the main characteristics of the 
Russian banking system and the introduction of the compulsory deposit insurance 
scheme in Russia. The description is followed by an illustration of the main changes 
in deposits’ amount pre- and post- adoption of deposit insurance law.  
The final section of this chapter is devoted to the comparison of the empirical 
evidence applied in the existing researches and description of the specifics – original 
contribution - of the model built in this thesis. 
 
2.2 Literature Review on Bank runs 
Kaufman (1988), in his paper Bank runs: causes, benefits and costs, defines a run 
on a bank as a phenomenon where a large number of depositors, fearing that their 
bank will be unable to repay their deposits in full and on time, simultaneously try to 
withdraw their funds immediately. It is important to highlight that the banking sector 
may be exposed to bank runs due to the fact that banks issue liquid liabilities but 
invest in illiquid assets. This provision of liquidity insurance, as describes Zhu 
(2001), may come at the risk of losses due to a panic-based bank run. The reason is 
that if all depositors at once demand their withdrawals, the bank will not be able to 
serve all of them and will fail. Moreover, a run on an individual bank may also affect 
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other solvent institutions or even the banking system as a whole. Neuberger (1991) 
stress that if a run starts at one bank and can spread to others, it imposes costs not 
only on the bank in question but also on the other banks. The size of this negative 
externality determines the costliness of bank runs and the desirability of encouraging 
depositor discipline. 
Back in the history, bank runs were an important economic phenomenon. United 
States experienced before the mid of 1930s severe bank runs where the number of 
bank failures averaged over 2000 per year (Samartin, 2002). Another significant 
example is the run on Argentinean banks in 2001 that resulted in a temporary closure 
of the banking system. Russia Federation, the country of interest for our paper in 
testing bank runs exposure, experienced as well a partial run in 2004 (Guta Bank and 
Alfa Bank) and 2008 (Globex). Other countries experiencing bank runs during global 
financial crisis 2007-2008 were U.K. with a run on Northern Rock that end up for 
bank being nationalized and the collapse of the U.S. investment bank Bear Stearns in 
2008 – event described by economists as being fundamentally similar to a run on a 
bank. Thus, taking into account the historical importance of bank runs and the costly 
adverse effects caused by them, it is important to understand why they occur and 
which implemented policies are effective to deal with them. In this sense, there are 
several economic theories to explain the occurrence of bank runs.  
One of the most influential theories on bank runs is the panic-based effect theory. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have provided substantial insights into defining 
particular panic episodes of the 1930s United States crises as bank runs. They come 
with the argumentation that panics originate from the lack of confidence on the 
banking sector, for e.g. bankruptcy of a big bank or loss of confidence in the local 
currency. A valuable contribution to the panic-based theory was added by the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) paper which presents a model where a run on a bank is 
a rational response to agents’ beliefs due to asymmetric information.  
The model shows how banks’ combination of illiquid assets and liquid liabilities 
– the deposits that consumer have the right to withdraw at any time - may lead to a 
self-fulfilling panic
1
 among depositors. Diamond and Dybvig affirm that any bank 
                                                 
1
 The term self-fulfilling prophecy was coined by Robert Merton (1948) as defining “a false definition 
of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true”. The 
term self-fulfilling prophecy was used by Diamond and Dybvig to describe a run on a bank caused by 
panic effects. 
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may suffer a massive withdrawal - it is enough for the individuals to believe that 
other depositors will run at that bank too.  
There is as well empirical evidence suggesting that bank runs are not random 
events. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) contest the Diamond and Dybvig theory on 
panics by analyzing what types of events or beliefs would lead to panics and 
eventually bank runs by combining the self-fulfilling prophecy and the fact that 
panics can be caused by depositor revisions in the perceived risk of bank debt when 
they are uninformed about bank asset portfolio values and receive adverse news 
about the macro economy. The panic view on the bank runs origin was as well 
discussed in the papers of Alen and Gale (1998) and Calomiris and Mason (2003) 
interpreting the self-fulfilling prophecy as contagion in the bank runs context. 
Calomiris state that liquidity problems and depositor runs were the reason of drove of 
the economically solvent independent banks into insolvency in the times of Great 
Depression. 
In addition to the panic-induced deposit withdrawal theory, there is empirical 
evidence suggesting that bank-fundamental factors, and in some cases both 
macroeconomic conditions and fundamental factors are on the origins of bank runs. 
The bank-fundamental and macroeconomic conditions are widely discussed in our 
paper as they stay at the base of our method to identify the probabilities of occurrence 
of bank runs for the Russian banking system during 2005-2011. 
One stream of the literature on bank runs develops an empirical analysis on the 
role of bank fundamentals in the bank runs exposure. Chari and Jagannathan (1988), 
Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Duffoo, M.A. (2004) argue that sudden deposit 
withdrawals during the crisis periods represent an informed market response to 
observable weaknesses in individual financial institutions, traceable to ex-ante bank 
characteristics as asset risk, solvency, liquidity, and profitability. Simorangkir (2011), 
by using a dynamic panel data model, investigate the determinants of bank runs and 
bank crises in Indonesia during 1997-1998. He shows empirically that both bank 
financial performance (ROA, NPL ratio affect bank run; while CAR ratio has an 
opposite influence on bank runs) and macroeconomic variables ( high exchange rate 
volatility, inflation and real interest rates on deposits) increase the probability of bank 
runs in Indonesia. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) conducted a research on the determinants 
of banking crises using a dataset of a combination of developed and developing 
countries from 1980-1994. The multivariate logit model used by them demonstrated 
that weak macroeconomic environments are closely related to the emergence of 
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banking crises, especially low GDP growth rates, high inflation, and high interest 
rates.  
On the other hand Kindleberger (1978), Allen and Gale (1998), and Zhu (2001) 
state that banking crises are part of a cycle that affects the financial sector which in 
turn becomes highly leveraged when a downturn occurs due to an increase in the non-
performing loans, leaving banks unable to pay depositors because majority of their 
creditors cannot repay their loans. In sum, what explain a bank run are bank-
fundamentals - real shocks and insolvency problems as the causes of depositors’ 
panics. 
Graeve and Karas (2008) investigate the Russian deposit market during 2002-
2007, finding evidence that both panic and the informational-based views can lead to 
bank runs. However, the same authors continue their research and quantify the effects 
of the two main theories of bank runs in another paper (2010) for the same sample 
and same period by incorporating cross-sectional heterogeneity into structural VARs 
and find that the panic view bank runs for Russia are much more important than the 
information-based. The authors believe that it is important from a regulatory point of 
view to know that depositors may punish banks for bad behavior in normal times – 
oriented by bank-fundamentals; it is quintessential to acknowledge, however, that 
they may not make that distinction during a financial crisis – and therefore be 
conducted by panics.   
 
2.3 Policy implications applied in preventing bank 
runs during history 
As Chu (2003) mentions in his paper, the bank runs are bad signs of financial 
instability being costly and economically inefficient because they interrupt financial 
intermediation and adversely affect economic activity and growth. Thus, it is 
important for the state to implement the correct policies in order to maintain and 
promote the financial stability and to prevent the arising bank runs due to asymmetric 
information and self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Against a panic-driven bank run the following policy responses were applied 
during history: suspension of convertibility of deposits (bank does not allow to be 
withdrawn more than a fraction of deposit), taxation on short-term deposits, capital 
requirements, and deposit insurance schemes. First two are more things of the past 
due to their negative effects, while deposit insurance and provision of liquidity 
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facilities are widely applied till present. Zhu’s (2001) investigations demonstrate that 
suspension of convertibility of deposits is inefficient in preventing runs because it 
can’t distinguish between those with true liquidity needs and those who are running 
on the banks. The author also accentuates the negative effect of taxation on short-
term deposits; policy that implemented can affect both the quantity and composition 
of early withdrawals, thus introducing investment distortions into the economy. On 
the other side, the last two policies, capital requirements measures and deposit 
insurance, as well experience many shortcomings. With regards to the capital 
requirements, the global regulatory standard Basel 3 was established to improve the 
banking regulations, especially with reference to the capital adequacy. However, this 
policy is hard to be maintained by the banks. The deposit insurance is also facing 
issues due to the moral hazard problems. A more detailed review on the costs and 
benefits of deposit insurance as a policy against bank runs is presented in chapter 2.4. 
Alternatively, when bank runs are based on fundamentals, should be applied 
regulations related to market discipline factor. For example, Graeve and Karas (2008) 
suggest imposing constraints on bank behavior or applying government 
recapitalization. 
 
2.4 Literature Review on the Deposit Insurance 
from perspective of policy implication against 
Bank Runs  
Deposit insurance is a guarantee up to a certain amount, often provided by a 
government agency, to protect bank depositors as well as the bank itself from 
likelihood and severity of bank runs during a financial crisis. By 2011, the 
International Association of Deposit Insures (IADI) counts 111 countries that have 
instituted some form of explicit deposit insurance up from 12 in 1974. Also, IADI 
mention another 41 countries that are studying or considering the implementation of 
an explicit deposit insurance system. The United States was the first country to 
introduce in 1933 a national deposit insurance system and from its experience we can 
deduct that any country that adopts a deposit insurance scheme must confront with 
the destabilizing effects of this policy on the banking sector of that country.  
Deposit insurance design varies across countries.  As Demirgüc-Kunt and Kane 
(2002) mention in their study on deposit insurance around the globe, an optimal 
worldwide blueprint is not likely to be found. The authors remark that depending on 
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each country in part, the account coverage varies from unlimited guarantees to tight 
coverage limits: on one hand, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and Turkey promise 100 
percent depositor coverage, while countries like Chile, Switzerland, and U.K. cover 
only an amount of deposits that is actually less than their per capita GDP as they 
state.   
Also, the empirical researches encounter different results on the impact of deposit 
insurance schemes on bank risk taking behavior. One stream of empirical studies has 
found that deposit insurance reduces bank risk (Karels and McClatchey 1999; Gropp 
and Vesala, 2001; Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2005). Also, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
consider in their paper deposit insurance to be an efficient policy to avoid socially 
undesirable bank runs. However, an additional paper of Cull, Senbet, and Sorge 
(2002), focused on the examination of cross-country data, suggests that DIS has a 
negative impact on financial development and growth in long run, except in countries 
with strong legal and regulatory institutions. Thus, the introduction of DIS needs to 
be accompanied by a strong regulatory scheme, otherwise, the new policy my lead to 
the financial system deterioration. 
On the other hand, another stream of empirical studies has shown that deposit 
insurance can create moral hazard, encourage banks to take high risks, and reduce the 
incentives of depositors to monitor banks (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detriagache, 2002; 
Cooper and Ross (2002), Laeven, 2002). For example Chu (2003), by studying 52 
countries over the period 1996–2007, finds that the higher the deposit insurance 
coverage, the more severe the banking crisis is. He empirically demonstrates that 
higher coverage tends to undermine market discipline and aggravate the moral hazard 
problem associated with deposit insurance. Thus, their effectiveness in promoting 
banking stability in the long term should not be taken for granted. Chernykh and Cole 
(2011) examine the impact of implementation of deposit insurance in Russia. Their 
results suggest that even the DIS had the effect of leveling the playing field between 
state-controlled banks and private; there were strong evidence of the increase in 
moral hazard. 
Another research on the moral hazard was provided by the Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2004) on a cross-country sample, including Russia, suggesting as well that 
explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same 
time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. 
It is very important to highlight that the effectiveness of deposit insurance as a 
policy against bank runs depends also on the established coverage rate. Many 
researchers have stressed that partial deposit insurance has a better effectiveness than 
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full deposit insurance. Ioannidou and Dreu (2006), by testing the deposit insurance on 
the Bolivian banking sector, showed that when the coverage rate is more than 60 
percent, market discipline is significantly reduced and it is completely eliminated 
when the coverage rate reaches 100 percent. Additionally, some papers emphasize the 
importance of client-bank relationship on bank runs. According to Iyer and Puri 
(2008) analysis, the collapse of a major bank in India in 2001 lead the depositors to 
run on a solvent bank, unrelated to the collapsed bank. Their findings suggest that 
deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing bank runs and accentuate 
that depositors with longer relationships and those who have availed of loans from a 
bank are less likely to run during a crisis. 
As a concluding remark on the studied literature review, we can state that deposit 
insurance represents a frequent policy implication implemented by countries 
nowadays. However, the conducted econometric researches present it only being 
partially effective in preventing bank runs, or even having serious adverse effects on 
the banking system. As a major concern to be taken into account is that deposit 
insurance may reduce the incentives of depositors to monitor and discipline their 
banks. Coupled with weak regulatory and supervisory systems, this could lead to 
huge costs, both for taxpayers and for the economy more generally, from 
exacerbating and prolonging crises (Ioannidou and Dreu, 2006). Thus, the major 
challenge for the policymakers is to create such a deposit insurance scheme that 
protects the financial system from systemic bank runs without reducing market 
discipline. 
2.5 Characteristics of the banking sector in 
Russia 
The main characteristics of the Russian banking system are: domination of state-
controlled banks on the market, existence of banks that have strong linkage with 
financial industrial groups, predominance of many tiny banks with a low share in the 
total sector activity, and the lack of foreign competition. The banking sector is 
considered to be of small size, very concentrated (first 30 banks account more than 
2/3 of market), and have a short-term nature of banking operations. Table 1 from 
Annex summarizes some general information in numbers about the banking sector in 
Russia during 2001-2011.  
Before 1980s the Gosbank was the controlling institution in the Soviet Union’s 
banking system, which combined the role of a central bank and a commercial bank by 
carrying out a variety of lending, holding deposits activities, monitoring population 
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payments and currency issue. In the late 1980s, with the implementation of Law on 
Cooperatives in 1988, the first non-state banks were formed. Chowdhury (2003), in 
his paper on the banking reform in Russia, mentions that as part of the economic 
reforms, the country moved away from the strictly centralized control of the mono-
bank system to a relatively more diversified and functionally more specialized two-
tier system. According to the author, the central banking functions were vested with 
Gosbank (from 1991 named Central Bank of Russia), while commercial banking 
functions were performed by five specialized institutions: Sberbank (savings), 
Vneshtorgbank (foreign trade), Promstroibank (industrial lending), Agroprombank 
(agricultural lending), and Zhilsotsbank (housing). However, only with the adoption 
of Federal Law 395-1 (02.12.1990) On Banks and Banking Activity, the development 
of the banking system started to take shape. In the process of privatization of the 
government property many private banks emerged, together with the so-called 
oligarchy and large financial industrial groups (e.g. Gazprombank). Meanwhile, 
many small regional banks emerged; mostly those had very strong ties with the local 
governments and companies. The major banks as Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank still 
remained under the government control (Gorshkov, 2012). This situation stands till 
present, where government remains to be the major shareholder of the banks with the 
dominant position on the market. 
Even though, at first glance, the total number of state-controlled banks is a small 
percentage in the total market share (see Figure 1), most of the small banks, also 
called pocket banks, do not operate as normal credit institutions, but rather are 
serving a single company or act as treasuries for financial-industrial groups and large 
corporations (Ippolito, 2002). Moreover, the majority of the private banks are so 
small that World Bank (2002) research classified less than 250 banks from Russia to 
have capital exceeding the EU established minimum capital requirements. Foreign 
banks presence is still considered relatively low in Russia to influence the market
2
. 
                                                 
2
 Russian banking sector has received limited foreign investment compared to other East European 
and Baltic States. In these countries, foreigners now control over half of the banking market; while 
Russian banks remain in the hands of the government and private domestic companies, themselves 
usually controlled by a handful of oligarchs (Chowdhury, 2003). 
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Figure 1: Russian banks by ownership type, % of market share (2011) 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on Central Bank of Russia data and A. Vernikov Paper on state-
controlled banks in Russia. 
As of the beginning of 2011 year, the CBR states 1012 credit institutions holding 
banking license in Russia. According to Gorshkov (2012), the peak of the number of 
banks was in 1995 when there were 2273 banks operating on the market. This 
number is gradually decreasing along the years (see evolution of the number of banks 
for 2001-2011 in Table 16 from Appendix A). However, when compared with the 
number of banking institutions in other countries the number of banks in Russia is 
still excessive. Despite the large number of institutions operating in the country, the 
first 5 banks prevail with a concentration of assets around 47% of the market (see 
Figure 2), providing evidence that the structure of the banking sector is strongly 
concentrated. 
 
Figure 2: Concentration of assets in the Russian banking sector 
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All five top banks (Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Russian Agricultural Bank, 
Bank Moskvy) are state-controlled banks. The biggest state-controlled bank and the 
leader on the market is Sberbank and in terms of volume of activity (e.g. in 1998 
Sberbank’s share of private deposits reached a peak of 80% of total market) and 
number of branches across the country. One fourth of branches are Sberbank 
branches (see Table 16 from Appendix A). 
Although the Russian banking system has gone through many transformations, it 
is still very weak and of small size in terms of industry sector. Figure 3 represents the 
banking sector’s total assets as a percentage of GDP for 2011 year. In 2011 the total 
assets as percentage of GDP was 76%. Corresponding figures are over 100% for 
countries as France (421%), UK (373%), and China (240%). The credit to private 
sector as percentage of GDP of 46.8% for 2011 is as well lower when compared with 
France (116%), UK (188%), US (193%), China (127%).  
 
Figure 3: Total Banking Sector Assets as % of GDP (2011) 
Source: Author’s computations based on Central Bank of above mentioned countries. 
Note:   For the evolution of the percentage of assets over GDP and percentage of credit to private 
sector over GDP ratios for 2001-2011 years please see Table 16 from Appendix A. 
According to Barnard and Thomsen (2002), the continued underdevelopment and 
weakness of the Russian banking system reflects the fundamental remaining problem 
of lack of trust: of the population in banks, of banks in borrowers, of foreign 
counterparties in Russian banks, and of banks in each other. This is one of the reasons 
why Russians prefer to keep their savings under mattresses rather than in bank 
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insurance and banking reform in Russia, mention a survey made in 2006 by VTsIOM 
indicating that 70 percent of Russians have not had a savings account in the past eight 
years, either because they had no money or simply because they did not trust the 
banks. 
In Table 4 are represented the ratio of the total household deposits as a 
percentage of GDP is only 22% as of 2011. The amount of household deposits as 
percentage of population’s income is only 31% for 2011. 
Table 1: Household Deposits as percentage of GDP (sector liabilities, population 
Income). 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Household Deposits 
(billion rubles): 
1980.8 2761.2 3809.7 5159.2 5907.0 7485.0 9818.0 
as % of GDP 11.6 12.8 14.2 15.5 14.3 19.3 22.1 
as % of the banking 
sector liabilities 
27.9 28.5 27.3 25.6 21.1 25.4 29.0 
as % of income of 
the population 
18.0 20.0 22.0 24.2 23.4 26.3 31.3 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on Central Bank of Russia data. 
Also, although the average of deposit interest rate is considered to be high in 
nominal terms, thus should be attractive for depositors (see Table 16 from Appendix 
A), when you take inflation into account it is still low. For the changes in deposit 
interest rates as well as the overview of the changes in the GDP, inflation, and M2 
during 2006-2011 please see Figure 10 and Figure 11 from Appendix A. 
Specific for Russian banking system is the fact that household deposits are legally 
required to be available on demand, regardless of contractual maturity. This inability 
to attract long term liability limits credit expansion (Chowdhury, 2003). From Figure 
4 we can observe that the largest share in the household deposits in terms of maturity 
in 2011 hold the deposits with terms longer than one year that make banking 
operations for Russian banking sector to have a short-term nature. Gorshkov (2012) 
also highlight the bank system inability to execute the function of converting deposits 
into investments, imposing companies to issue bonds or attract capital from foreign 
markets instead. Thus, the banking system is still far from playing the role that it 
should in intermediating savings and investment. 
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Figure 4: Structure of deposits of individuals, depending on the term (in %) 
 
Source: State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency. 
On the base of the crisis of depositors confidence in the Russian banking system 
lie as well the systemic problems from: 1994 (rubble collapse), 1995 (liquidity crisis 
in the interbank market when a large number of banks failed), 1998
3
 (government’s 
default on its ruble bonds and subsequent ruble devaluation; many depositors lost 
their savings) and 2004 – where Graeve and Karas (2008) mention a severe bank run 
at the beginning of 2004 where several large banks suffered from deposit withdrawals 
(e.g. Guta Bank and Alfa Bank). Since 1992, as a consequence of these crises, more 
than 2000 Russian banks have been liquidated or have vanished (Karas, Schoors, 
Weill, 2008). The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 reached Russian market as well. In 
2008 several Russian banks failed due to liquidity issues related to US credit 
derivatives. According to Stratfor’s article with a very meaningful name, Russia: A 
Bank Run and Fears of a Repeat, the Russian bank Globex barred customers from 
withdrawing money from their accounts on October, 15 in the first bank run of the 
current global economic crisis spreading to other Russian banks panic mode. 
Given the large number of private depositors who have lost their savings in 
Russian bank crisis, state came with the introduction of compulsory deposit insurance 
scheme in order to improve confidence in the country's banking system. Before, 
                                                 
3
 On September 3, 1998, during the 1998 Russian financial crisis, private accounts at the SBS-Agro and 
MENATEP banks, Inkombank, Promstroibank, Most Bank, and Moscow Business Bank were frozen. 
Depositors at these banks were given the opportunity to transfer their money to the Sberbank at the 
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Sberbank was the only bank that enjoyed consumer confidence because of the deposit 
insurance guarantee provided by the state. With a 100 percent covered government 
guarantee, the Sberbank’s deposit market share at that time was 63 percent from total 
deposits. This distorted market competition conditions and created incentives for 
future moral hazard.  
The Federal Law On Insurance of Household Deposits in Banks of the Russian 
Federation was adopted by the State Duma on 28.11.2003. Tompson (2004) 
mentioned that took more than a decade for the law to be approved by the Duma. The 
objectives of this Federal Law are: (i) to protect the rights and legal interests of 
depositors of the Russian Federation, (ii) to strengthen confidence in the Russian 
Federation’s banking system, and (iii) to encourage attraction of household savings 
mobilization in the banking system of the Russian Federation. The law only covers 
deposits of physical persons, excluding corporate and inter-bank deposits. In 2004 the 
limit of cover was up to 100 000 RUB. Foreign currency-denominated deposits are 
covered (up to 100 000 RUR equivalent), payable in rubles, and converted at the 
foreign exchange rate determined by the CBR. The state-controlled Sberbank did not 
participate in the deposit insurance scheme at that stage, but will join it only starting 
with January 2007. In August 9, 2006 the coverage was increased till 190 000 RUB, 
while from March, 26 2007 the coverage limit increased up to 400 000 RUB. The last 
amendment to the law was made in the fall of 2008, increasing the coverage limit at 
100 percent of deposits up to but not more than 700 000 RUB (Federal Law of 
13.10.2008 N 174-FZ).   
Simultaneously, in January 2004 was created the Russian Deposit Insurance 
Agency (DIA) whose primary responsibilities were: determining the deposit 
insurance premium, receiving payments from registered banks, making pay-outs to 
depositors in case of bank failures, managing the Deposit Insurance Fund, and 
administering bankruptcy proceedings to liquidate insolvent banks (Camara, Montes-
Negret, 2006). 
Specific for Russian banking system is that banks entered into the deposit 
insurance at different points in time rather than all at once. Figure 5 presents how 
many banks were accepted by the CBR quarterly during 2004-2011. 
 
  24 
Figure 5: Number of banks licensed by CRB to take deposits: DIS member and 
non-DIS members. 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on Central Bank of Russia, State Corporation Deposit Insurance 
Agency data 
Currently, under the protection of DIA are 895 banks - participants in the system 
(as of June, 2012), including: operating banks licensed to work with individuals - 
787; operating credit institutions before taking deposits, but lost the right to attract 
individuals' funds -11; banks in liquidation – 97. The DIA fund’s size is currently 193 
billion rubles. The main sources of the DIA’s funds are state fees (7.9 billion rubles.), 
banks’ insurance premiums and income from the investments of the fund.  
 
Figure 6: Growth of household deposits during the period of 2004-2011 
 
Source: State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency. 
The insurance premiums are paid by banks on a quarterly basis. The premium 
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size of the insured household deposits in the bank for the corresponding quarter. 
Figure 6 shows that as a consequence of DIS there is a subsequent growth in the 
amount of deposits. Although private deposit collection is growing, it remains far 
behind corporate lending.  As previously mentioned, Sberbank was the only bank that 
was enjoying consumer confidence because of the deposit insurance guarantee 
provided by the state before 2004. After mandatory DIS implementation for all 
Russian banks, Sberbank was initially exempted and kept its full state guarantee until 
January 2007, when it finally joined the new deposit insurance scheme. Other 
regulatory advantages of Sberbank (for e.g. lower required reserves on ruble deposits) 
were also abolished (Karas, Schoors, Weill, 2008).  
Figure 7: Share of Sberbank and 30 top banks in total deposit market (in %) 
 
Source: State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency. 
 
This ensured that Sberbank’s share of private deposits gradually fell during the 
last years. However, the amount of deposits is still considered to be at a very high 
level (see Figure 7).  During 2005-2011 Sberbank’s shares are at the level between 
50% and 45% from the total share of the 30 top banks on the market. 
Considering the current weakness of the  Russian banking system, Camara and 
Montes-Negret (2006) stress that is surprising that over 80 percent (more than 90 in 
the present) of all Russian banks have been so easily admitted under the deposit 
insurance system and that the number looks to grow further. As a concluding remark, 
I would like to highlight that an ample number of researches provide convincing 


















































Share of Sberbank  Share of 30 top banks  
  26 
may increase moral hazard risk. Thus, DIS is not yet a guarantee of bank stability and 
absence of bank runs. 
 
2.6 Review of Empirical Literature on Bank Runs 
and Deposit Insurance  
There are two main directions in the econometrical studies on depositors’ 
behavior with the purpose to check for the probability of bank runs occurrence. The 
first, stress on the existence of market discipline and its effectiveness on the deposit 
market (Semenova, 2007; Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004), as well as on the 
impact of deposit insurance schemes on bank risk-taking behavior and the exposure 
to moral hazard (Chernykh and Cole, 2011; Gropp and Vesala, 2001; Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Detriagache, 2002; Laeven, 2002). The econometric model applied in most of 
these papers is based on a continuous function
4
. Thus, the dependent variable specific 
for this model is unlimited and continuous, and usually is represented by the change 
in the amount of deposits. 
The second type of econometric researches are focused on the study of factors 
that lead to the outflows of deposits from banks and under what categories these 
factors can be classified: panics-based, bank fundamentals, or macroeconomic factors 
as well as what is the probability of occurrence of bank runs (or crises) under these 
factors (Solntsev and Mamonov, 2012; Simorangkir, 2011; Graeve and Karas, 2008, 
2010; Iyer and Puri, 2008). The specific econometric model used in these papers is 
based on a discrete function where the dependent variable takes value between 0 and 
1. Authors usually use a logit (probit, tobit) model to test for bank run probability
5
.  
The aim of our paper is to study the depositors’ behavior after the implementation 
of deposit insurance scheme in Russia and understand what forces made depositors to 
come and withdraw their money; with other words, what is the probability of bank 
                                                 
4
 Exception: Demirgüc-Kunt and Detriagache (2002) who estimate a logit probability model to test 
how deposit insurance increase bank fragility. 
5
 Exception: Simorangkir (2011) who uses a panel data model to test for bank runs and Graeve and 
Karas (2008, 2010) who identify bank runs by incorporating a cross-sectional heterogeneity into 
structural VARs. 
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run for Russian banks. Therefore, our research is closer to the second type of 
econometric researches.  
A detailed comparison of the models used in the discussed econometric papers 
concerning bank runs and deposit insurance is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Related Empirical Studies on Bank Runs and DIS 
Data Paper Model Used * 
Country-level Chernykh, Cole (2011) continuous function Russia 
  Simorangkir (2011) continuous function  
  Graeve, Karas (2008 and 2010) continuous function Russia 
  Iyer and Puri (2008) discrete function 
(probit) 
 
  Semenova (2007) continuous function Russia 
  Ioannidou, Dreu (2006) continuous function  
  Gropp and Vesala (2001) continuous function  





Cross-country level Berger, Turk-Ariss (2011) continuous function  




Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2004) 
continuous function  
 
Source: Author’s computations 
(Note) * Research includes Russia 
Table 2 shows that the most recent econometric researches in this area that 
includes Russian market as Chernykh, Cole (2011), Graeve, Karas (2008 and 2010), 
Semenova (2007), and Solntsev and Mamonov (2011). Only Solntsev and Mamonov 
(2011) use a binary choise model to test their assumptions. Specific for our model, 
we take only one country – Russia – for e.g. Solntsev and Mamonov used for their 
analysis 20 countries (e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, Republic of Moldova, Russia, 
Estonia, Argentina, etc.) with a very different economic development and banking 
system structure. We consider by taking only Russia to keep the specifics of the 
country and decrease the error in estimating probability of bank runs. Additionally, 
our research tests the effectiveness of DIS scheme in Russia, which is an important 
element in estimating bank run probability. We consider the utilized reliable data 
from multiple sources and the unique combination of variables to bring an original 
contribution to the research of bank runs in Russian banking industry and offer an 
important breakthrough at the empirical level. 
 
  28 




3.1   Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the theoretical and empirical methodology used to test the 
probability of bank runs on Russian banks during 2005-2011. Additionally, it 
provides detailed explanation of variables employed in the model as well a theoretical 
background on the logit model used to test our hypotheses. 
 
3.2   Assumptions and Hypotheses 
Following the discussion on bank runs literature review from Chapter 2, the 
occurrence of bank runs can be caused by panic effects, bank-fundamental factors, or 
macroeconomic conditions. Before building our hypotheses, it is useful to highlight 
the difference between the concept of run and failure. A run on a bank by the 
depositors not always leads that bank to failure. Thus, our main interest for this 
research is to only investigate what motivates depositors in Russia to run on a bank 
without investigating further probability of failure on those banks. 
The first two hypotheses focus on testing the effect of bank-fundamentals and, 
respectively, macroeconomic conditions in a bank run. For the hypotheses to hold is 
assumed the dependent variables related to these factors to be significant. A detailed 
explanation on the variables is provided in section 3.6. 
H1: Weak bank-fundamental factors may lead to the withdrawal of depositors from 
that bank, thus causing a bank run phenomena. 
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H2: Weak macroeconomic conditions may lead to bank deposit withdrawals from 
banking system of that country. 
Our third hypothesis focuses on the panic-induced deposit withdrawal factor. One 
of the main policy implications against panic-based withdrawals is considered to be 
the deposit insurance scheme. Considering the deposit insurance law implementation 
in 2004, the panic effects on deposit withdrawals should not be expected for the 
Russian banks which entered the deposit insurance. Third hypothesis is intended to 
test this assumption. 
H3: The deposit insurance implementation helps avoid exposure to bank runs. 
Before DIS implementation, in the last 20 years, in Russia were identified three 
banking crises – in 1994, 1995, and 1998 where depositors suffered substantial losses 
(Chernykh and Cole, 2010). Also, Karas and Graeve (2008) identify in their research 
one severe bank run at the beginning of 2004 where several large banks suffered from 
deposit withdrawals. However there are few researches testing the probability of bank 
runs for the 2005-2011 periods (after DIS implementation). The aim of this study is 
to complete the empirical literature on bank runs on Russian banking system for post-
insured period and test how beneficial was the decision of DIS policy regulation. 
 
3.3   Data description 
The dataset used for our research comprises observations made from a sample of 
over 900 commercial banks in Russian Federation over the period 2005-2011, 
quarterly basis. The choice of explanatory variables is based on the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature on Bank Runs discussed in Chapter 2. The 
quarterly bank data have been taken from the database of the financial information 
agency Interfax
6
. The source of data for the calculation of the list of Interfax-100 is 
the so-called form 101 (Balance Sheet turnover) and form 102 (Profit and Loss 
Statement), published on the website of the Russian Central Bank. Table 3 contains 
the information on the number of banks per quarter included in our model.  The 
sample of data limits only to banks holding the license to attract household deposits. 
                                                 
6
 The Statistical database of Interfax /Interfax-100. Russian Banks/ covers available bank data starting 
with only 2005 year, reason why our research is limited to the study of the period after deposit 
insurance implementation in 2004. 
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The monthly Bulletins of Central Bank of Russia provides the information on the 
license type that holds each commercial bank in Russia. The last source used to 
collect the data on each bank entry into the deposit insurance system is provided by 
the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). Specific for Russian banking system are the 
different points in time banks entered into the new DIS. The number increased 
gradually and not all at once which, in our opinion, represents an advantage in testing 
how DIS implementation influenced Russian banking system. 





Foreign  Private- 
domestic  
2005 q4  824 682 142 26 39 759 
2006 q1  812 562 250 25 33 754 
2006 q2 814 568 246 26 34 754 
2006 q3 891 613 278 25 37 829 
2006 q4 937 653 284 27 41 869 
2007 q1 925 651 274 27 40 858 
2007 q2 927 652 275 27 39 861 
2007 q3 921 651 270 27 40 854 
2007 q4 914 656 258 27 42 845 
2008 q1 932 678 254 27 45 860 
2008 q2 924 672 252 27 45 852 
2008 q3 922 680 242 25 45 852 
2008 q4 901 673 228 26 43 832 
2009 q1 897 617 280 21 42 834 
2009 q2 902 689 213 25 47 830 
2009 q3 895 689 206 27 47 821 
2009 q4 886 689 197 27 47 812 
2010 q1 895 706 189 28 47 820 
2010 q2 888 708 180 28 46 814 
2010 q3 877 709 168 28 47 802 
2010 q4 872 706 166 28 47 797 
2011 q1 864 705 159 28 48 788 
2011 q2 860 706 154 27 48 785 
2011 q3 851 707 144 28 47 776 
2011 q4 836 703 133 28 46 762 
 
Source: Author’s computations.  
Note: (*) Total number of Russian banks with license to attract private deposits at the beginning of 
each period is mentioned in Table 1 from Annex. 
The gathered panel bank-specific data is unbalanced because some banks failed, 
merged (in our sample if bank merged, the resulting bank is taken as new) or were 
founded during the sample period. The reason of taking unbalanced data was to cover 
as many banks as possible. Also, according to Central Bank requirements towards 
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commercial banks, reporting the information to central banks is obligatory. However, 
public reporting on the official site of CBR is voluntary – reason why not all the 
banks grant CBR to disclose their data.  
Depending on the ownership, the Russian banking system comprises state-
controlled, foreign, and private-domestic banks. To identify state-controlled banks, 
was used the list build on the basis of A. Vernikov paper, Government Banking in 
Russia: Magnitude and New Features (2011). The list of foreign banks was taken 
from the CBR site. Our research is also based on macroeconomic variables. The 
sources used for identification of these variables were the World Bank database – for 
GDP growth data and unemployment; Central Bank of Russia’s Quarterly Inflation 
Review – for inflation rate, exchange rate of EUR/RUB, and exchange rate of 
USD/RUB. A logit model in a panel data framework was applied for testing our 
hypotheses. The detailed description of the model is provided in the following 
sections. 
 
3.4 The Logistic Regression 
The logistic regression is used for the prediction of the probability of occurrence 
of an event by fitting data into a logistic function. Logit distribution is an S-shaped 
distribution function (see Figure 8), which is similar to the standard- 
 
Figure 8: Linear Probability Model 
 
Source: Baltagi. Econometrics 
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The dependent variable for the logit model is binary as the outcome we are 
interested in is not a continuous variable but a binary outcome. For example, the logit 
model is suitable when you want to analyze whether an event occurred or not – in our 
thesis we are interested to test if a bank run occurred on Russian banking system 
during the analyzed period or not. In order to construct the model, we assume that an 
unobservable variable Y* determines the value of the observable dependent binary 
variable Y, e.g. as follows: 
        
    
   
    
   
                                             (3.1) 
The unobservable variable Y* depends on banks’ characteristics as well as on an 
error term, in the following way: 
  
                                                                           
where β is parameters’ vector,     - vector of the values of explanatory variables for 
the i-th bank and    is the error term. The distribution of    is assumed to be logistic 
Λ. This implies that the probabilities of bank run and non-bank run are equal to: 
              Λ         
         
           
                                                                   
                          
         
           
                                                     
One issue with this model is the probability    on the left-hand-side that has to be 
between zero and one, while the linear predictor      on the right-hand-side can take 
any real value, thus there is no guarantee that the predicted values will be in the 
correct range unless complex restrictions are imposed on the coefficients. A simple 
solution to this problem is to transform the probability to remove the range 
restrictions, and model the transformation as a linear function of the covariates by 




                                                 
7
 The information on the logistic regression described in section 3.4 was based on the descriptions of 
logit model from Baltagi (2008), Maddala (2001), Majer (2010) and www.appstate.edu 
8
 Princeton University research site: data.princeton.edu, Logit models for binary data 
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As an alternative to odds in interpreting logit coefficients comes marginal effect. 
The analysis of Marginal Effects in logit regression requires that we examine: 
   
   
 
       
   
  
       
    
 
    
   
                                         
However, the odds ratios are preferred to marginal effects as the interpretation of 
the logit coefficients is usually more intuitive with odds ratios. The parameters of 
logit model are usually estimated with the maximum likelihood estimation. 
          
  
 
   
           
                                            
The log-likelihood function is: 
                    
 
   
                                             
The higher the likelihood function, the higher the probability of observing the 
dependent variable values in the sample. 
To test for statistical significance of independent variables can be used the Wald 
test (analogous to the t-test in linear regression) - the ratio between the square of the 
regression coefficient and the square of the standard error of the coefficient, 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square distribution: 
       
  
 
    
                                                                 
where the                          
To measure the overall performance of the model, as goodness of fit for our logit 
regression, there are designed several pseudo-   measures that have been developed 
specifically for models where dependent variable takes only two values y. 
- McFadden’s     
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where     and    correspond to likelihood functions of the unrestricted and restricted 
model. 
- Percentage (proportion) of correct predictions: number of total 
predictions/total number of observations - assumes that if the predicted probability is 
greater than or equal to 0.5 then the event is expected to occur and not occur 
otherwise. 
 
3.5   Dependent variable 
According to the general definition, a bank run happen when the financial 
institution suffers a large   withdrawal of deposits because customers believe that the 
financial institution is or exist the probability to become insolvent. As we are 
interested to investigate the factors that motivates depositors in Russia to run on a 
bank, our dependent variable (observable variable) is expected to be Bank Run. As 
unobservable variable is identified the quarterly percentage changes in deposits for 
bank i.  
Our formulation of dependent variable    takes 1 in the period when there was a 
bank run, and 0 in all other periods in the bank i. Thus, the essence of the values of 
unobservable variable, for example, equal to 1, is defined as the decrease in the 
quarterly percentage change in deposits higher than 10%. 
 
3.6   Independent variables 
Based on the literature review on Bank runs, our explanatory variables were 
splited into two main categories: financial bank performance variables and 
macroeconomic variables. Bank-level variables serve as a proxy for bank liquidity, 
risk, profitability and solvency of the analyzed banks. While the macroeconomic 
variables represent how the banking system is influenced by changes that the 
economy experiences over time.  
 Capital Adequacy Ratio  
This ratio, measured as capital to total assets, has been developed as a measure of 
bank solvency that helps to protect depositors and promote the bank stability and 
efficiency. Capital serves as a buffer for unexpected losses incurred on the bank’s 
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assets. The higher the capital ratio, the less likely it is that losses will hurt the 
depositors. The amount of equity indicates how much the value of the assets may 
decline before the position of depositors and other creditors is jeopardized (Lanine, 
Vennet, 2005). Hence, the higher the ratio the more reliable the bank is considered to 
be. It is expected to be a significant determinant of bank runs, fact confirmed by 
numerous empirical studies (Gangopadhyay and Singh, 2000), McCulloch and Yu, 
1998) show that if there is an adequate equity level with a bank, then depositors have 
an assurance and panic runs can be avoided).  
 Debt ratio 
The debt ratio is a measure of bank’s leverage. A high debt ratio for a bank means 
the inability to meet its financial obligations, thus this could be a problem if many 
depositors start to demand their deposits back. The dependent variable debt ratio is 
calculated as the ratio of total liability over total assets.  
 Return on Assets (ROA) 
An indicator on how profitable the bank is relative to its total assets. A high ROA 
is associated with strong and healthy banks, which should decrease the probability of 
bank run. Return on Assets ratio was used as a measure of resilience against bank 
runs in many empirical studies (Lanine, Vennet, 2005; Simorangkir, 2011). 
 Bank size – log of Assets  
This variable characterizes the size of the bank. We can assume that larger banks 
have a higher level of confidence for Russian depositors, therefore, the higher the 
bank, the lower the probability of bank runs. 
 Deposits interest rate  
If deposit interest rates rise, it will become more attractive to make deposits in the 
bank rather than spend as you will get a better rate of return from saving your money. 
On the other side, there is empirical evidence (Kraft and Galac, 2007) showing that 
high deposit interest rates were used as a source of funding for risky banks, and had 
important negative external effects on healthy banks, thus making a strong 
contribution to the banking crisis. 
Also, it is essential to highlight the importance to take the real interest rate as a 
dependent variable and not the nominal in order to capture the real growth. The real 
interest rate is nominal interest rates minus inflation. 
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Gunsel (2008) stress that high real interest rates would signal an impending 
liquidity problem in the financial system that would indicate deterioration in 
commercial bank loan portfolios and is also potentially to result in a slowdown in the 
rate of economic growth. In such an environment banks are faced with increasing 
financial and credit risks. Hence, in such circumstances it is expected that an increase 
in interest rates would serve to increase the probability of bank run due to 
deterioration of bank fundamentals. 
According to Domaç and Peria (2003), high real interest rates can reduce banks’ 
profits or produce losses. Additionally, the author mention that increasing interest 
rates make loan repayments harder for debtors and adversely affect banks by 
increasing non-performing loans, thus, contributing to systemic banking sector 
problems. 
Initially was planned to be tested as well the NPL – non-performing loans 
variable. However, due to the unavailability of data for this variable in the Interfax 
data base it was excluded from the test. 
 Inflation 
We can assume that a higher inflation would lead to economic uncertainty and 
greater tendency for bank runs. According to Fisher theory, an increase in prices can 
influence a decrease in deposit attractiveness as the consumption in this period needs 
more funds. Thus, high inflation tends to be associated with an increase in the 
probability of banking sector distress. Gunsel (2008), in his research on micro and 
macro determinants on bank fragility, mentions that sudden changes in inflation can 
have a negative impact on interest rates and deterioration of bank capital (expansion 
in non-performing loans) and collateral values, and also weaken bank balance sheets.  
 GDP growth rate 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) the declining GDP growth 
rate as well as a high inflation (variable described above) rate would increase the 
likelihood of bank failures. Including GDP growth variable in the model would help 
not only to capture the effect of general level of economy at a given time, but also to 
take into account the impact of the crisis without the necessity to enter for this 
another separate variable.  
Economic analysts argue that banking crises are commonly preceded by a 
significant contraction in real GDP growth. Thus, an increase in the GDP growth rate 
is negatively related to the probability of failure. 
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 Exchange rate 
For this model was taken the RUB/USD exchange rate and the RUB/EUR 
exchange rate. These variables can be analyzed from two perspectives. First, they 
characterize the alternative ways to invest savings. For example, with RUB fall, value 
deposits denominated in domestic currency become less attractive than deposits 
denominated in foreign currencies.  As a consequence, the value of deposits in 
domestic currency decreases relative to that of foreign currency. On the other hand, 
Semenova (2007) in her paper draws attention to the fact that the deposits include as 
well deposits in foreign currency and according to the accounting standards they are 
converted into rubles to be reflected in balance sheets. So the influence of exchange 
rates is also expressed in changes in their value in rubles (the interest payment 
include those paid for deposits in foreign currency as well).  
Domaç and Peria (2003) also mention the government dilemma regarding 
exchange rate fluctuations when analyzing 95 developed and developing countries’ 
exchange rate policies. The authors argue that if the government pegs the exchange 
rate, banks can suffer self-fulfilling runs motivated by investors’ fears that others will 
run first and exhaust bank’s reserves, while if the government allows the exchange 
rate to float, banks and firms will be affected by the currency mismatch problem.  
In the model are also included Institutional Variables as: 
 Deposit Insurance Dummy 
The information from the Deposit Insurance Agency related to the dates of 
admittance to DIS allow us to construct a dummy variable that equals 1 from the 
quarter bank entered deposit insurance and 0 otherwise. Thus, DIS dummy variable 
helps us identify what banks in the Russian banking industry benefited from the 
introduction of the deposit insurance system.  
 Ownership Dummy 
Russia’s banking system is dominated by state-controlled banks. The Economist 
in 2011 states that Sberbank, the biggest bank, holds 54% of deposits, calling the 
banking industry of Russia in the shadow of giants. 
In order to better capture the degree of changes in deposits depending on the type 
of ownership we introduced a dummy that helps us identify the state-controlled 
banks. This variable is equal to 1 if the bank is a state-controlled bank and 0 
otherwise. Under the state-controlled are included the directly state-owned banks or 
  38 
banks whose primary owner is public corporations or regional authorities. As 
mentioned in chapter 3.3, the list of state-controlled banks was formed on the basis of 
A.Vernikov paper as CBR does not provide any such list on their site.  
 Demographic Dummy 
To distinguish between private-domestic banks and foreign-controlled banks, we 
introduced an additional dummy variable that identifies from the sample which is the 
foreign-controlled banks. Thus, the dummy equals to 1 if there is a foreign bank and 
0 otherwise. 
Table 4 reports the data descriptive statistics as means, standard deviations, and 
definitions for our independent variables. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics (entire sample of banks) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Debt ratio 22072 0.957 0.103 0.81 0.92 
Capital Adeq.  22072 9.961 4.338 1.585 82.09 
ROA  22072 0.467 0.449 -5.687 5.317 
logASSETS  22072 14.618 1.809 7.703 23.07 
            
Inflation 22167 11.008 2.425 7.390 15.16 
GDP Growth  22167 7.257 0.570 -10.400 7.90 
RUB/USD  22167 26.795 2.020 2.824 32.11 
RUB/EUR  22167 40.121 2.762 3.653 44.89 
Real interest r.  22167 4.382 0.477 1.557 5.30 
            
dState  22167 0.030 0.171 0 1 
dForeign  22167 0.049 0.215 0 1 
dDIS  22167 0.754 0.430 0 1 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata. 
 
Given the assumption that Russian depositors’ trust more state banks, we divided 
banks in 3 samples state-controlled, foreign-controlled, and private-domestic banks 
for a deeper analysis of bank-fundamentals variables. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the 
data descriptive statistics bank-fundamentals variables divided on all three categories. 
The data suggest the mean for size of assets and the mean for profitability ratios to be 
higher in the state-controlled sample, confirming the dominance of state banks in 
Russian banking sector. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics (state-controlled sample of banks) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Debt ratio 666 2.599 0.526 1.06 2.77 
Capital Adeq.  666 8.757 5.132 2.84 63.88 
ROA  666 11.031 8.680 0.01 18.59 
logASSETS  666 16.992 2.415 12.30 23.07 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (foreign-controlled sample of banks) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Debt ratio 305 1.121 0.065 1.06 1.37 
Capital Adeq.  305 21.534 12.619 8.36 90.34 
ROA  305 2.467 2.338 -5.68 6.27 
logASSETS  305 16.132 2.234 10.13 22.14 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics (private-domestic sample of banks) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Debt ratio 20324 0.962 0.216 0.92 8.3 
Capital Adeq.  20324 11.089 5.865 1.58 92.12 
ROA  20324 0.473 0.401 -3.77 4.83 
logASSETS  20324 14.456 1.661 7.70 20.63 




Based on the hypotheses stated in section 3.2, the estimated model is as follows: 
           
 
   
               
 
   
                                    
                
i=1…N, represents a cross-sectional unit 
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t=1…T, represents quarterly time series (the time effect) 
k=1…K, represents a specific explanatory variable from      
h=1…H, represents a specific explanatory variable from        
    stands for Bank runs measured by unobservable variable    
  - quarterly 
percentage change in deposits;      stands for vector of bank fundamentals factors of 
the bank i; and         stands for the vector of macroeconomic factors that 
influence the depositors’ decisions. 
Also, our explanatory variables will be lagged by one period as it is expected that 
the factors’ value in period t to be dependent on the values of other factors in period 
t-1. The list of dependent variables included in each vector is presented in Table 3.3 
together with the expected sign for each variable in part. 
 
Table 8: Independent variables Expected Signs 
Variable name Symbol Formula 
Expected sign 
(prob.of run) 
Bank fundamentals variables     
Capital Adeq.Ratio CAR Capital/Total Assets - 
Debt Ratio DebtR 




Return on Assets ROA Net Income/Total Assets - 
Bank Size logASSETS Log(Total Assets) - 


















Source: Author’s computations.  
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4. Results and Interpretation 
Chapter 4 
Results and Interpretation 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the empirical results based on the model described in the 
methodology section from chapter 3. The empirical results are interpreted and 
analyzed in order to verify the hypothesis validity. The analysis includes a complete 
correlation analysis between variables, a wide description of results on each section 
of variables in part, and the tests applied to proof model veracity. Based on the main 
findings of this chapter, we build our conclusion and discussion paragraphs regarding 
the bank runs prevention in Russia. 
4.2 Estimation of Results   
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, our empirical investigation on bank runs is 
based on a logistic model. We aim to test the three formulated hypotheses by running 
the model in the STATA statistical software. As we are interested to identify the 
factors that lead to the occurrence of bank runs for Russian banks during 2005-2011, 
it is worth to mention that in the context of analysis of causal processes it is specific 
that some factors’ value in period t to be dependent on the values of other factors in 
period t-1. Thus, in order to avoid simultaneity problems we lag all explanatory 
variables by one period, apart from bank assets for which we take log in order to 
measure bank size. 
Also, before we run the logit model we must test for colinearity. Multicolinearity 
is a specific phenomenon when the explanatory variables are highly correlated 
between each other, reason which could lead us to invalid results. Therefore, in order 
to evaluate the interaction of our independent variables we performed two correlation 
matrices: one for all our explanatory variables and another for their lags t-1. The 
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results in Table 9 and Table 10 show no statistically significant evidence of high 
correlations between variables that could bias our results.  
Table 9: Correlation Matrix between bank-fundamentals variables 
Variable DebtR  CA  ROA  logASSETS  
DebtR  1.0000       
CA  0.1097 1.0000     
ROA  0.0359 0.5322 1.0000   
logASSETS  -0.0909 -0.2393 -0.0618 1.0000 
                   Source: Author’s computations in Stata. 
Table 10: Correlation Matrix between macroeconomics variables 
Variable INFL  GDP_GR  RUB_USD  RUB_EUR  RDIR  
INFL  1.0000         
GDP_GR  -01078 1.0000       
RUB_USD  -0.3481 -0.6601 1.0000     
RUB_EUR  -0.0283 -0.7921 0.7525 1.0000   
RDIR  0.2102 -0.8367 0.3963 0.6620 1.0000 
          Source: Author’s computations in Stata. 
However, when taking the relevant lags, we can notify a higher presence of 
correlation between our variables (see Table 11 and Table 12). For example, there is 
high correlation between bank-fundamentals variables as on the base of their 
calculation formula there is asset component. Regarding macroeconomics variables, 
we notified a higher correlation between GDP growth variable and inflation variable, 
as well as inflation and exchange rates lags. 
Table 11: Correlation Matrix between bank-fundamentals variables lags 
Variable lagDebtR  lagCA  lagROA  logASSETS  
lagDebtR  1.0000       
lagCA  0.5462 1.0000     
lagROA  0.0445 0.0506 1.0000   
logASSETS  -0.1015 -0.0263 -0.1435 1.0000 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix between macroeconomics variables lags 
Variable lagINFL  lagGDP_GR  lagRUB_USD  lagRUB_EUR  lagRDIR  
lagINFL  1.0000         
lagGDP_GR  0.7207 1.0000       
lagRUB_USD  0.6318 0.5806 1.0000     
lagRUB_EUR  -0.6380 -0.6552 -0.1495 1.0000   
lagRDIR  -0.2424 -0.2328 -0.1949 0.3137 1.0000 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata. 
Moreover, we attempt to minimize any existing correlation and bias among our 
explanatory variables by running various combinations of variables that we 
incorporated in four sets of regression equations (see Table 13). Of the 
macroeconomic indicators, EUR and USD exchange rates are closely related and, 
thus, they do not use them together in the models. Similarly, GDP growth and 
inflation were separated within the four existing models in order to avoid close 
correlation. Of the financial indicators, since the formula of calculating all four bank-
fundamentals variables is based on bank’s assets value, we performed the regressions 
on each parameter separately in order to avoid multicollinearity in our model 
specifications. 
Table 13: Results of the Logit Analysis of Determinants of Bank Runs 
Variables 




- - - 
(0.072) 
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lagRDIR  - - 
0.752***   
(0.000)   
Institutional Variables         
dState  - 
-1.356*** -1.166* -0.936*** 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
dForeign  
0.365 
- - - 
(0.097) 
dDIS  
-0.205 -1.004*** -1.055*** -0.921*** 
(0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 
-2.143*** -5.797*** -7.769*** -1.916** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Model Statistics         
Wald Chi2 24.53 271.40 126.07 382.61 
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.056 0.055 0.069 
Log likelihood -969.43 -6459.32 -1793.49 -6391.37 
No. of Obs. 1452 17613 3971 17686 
LR chi2 23.53 776.67 211.52 959.67 
AIC 1.342 0.734 0.907 0.723 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata 
Note:  (1) ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level;                             
(2) values in the parentheses indicate the p-value; for more information regarding the 
results of the model, see Appendix B 
 
The findings suggest that the great majority of the independent variables are 
statistically significant and can be explained as follows: 
 Bank-fundamentals Characteristics 
The findings on the debt ratio indicate that banks with a high debt ratio are more 
likely to be exposed to bank runs. In our model we find debt ratio positively related 
with our dependent variable, having a p-value of 0.079. The results agree with those 
obtained by Gunsel (2008), Graeve and Karas (2008), Duffoo (2004), and Semenova 
(2007). 
The result on ROA profitability measure is positive, with the p-value of 0.029 and 
statistically significant at 10% level. Regarding the potential interpretation of this 
indicator of net profits to total assets, it can be noted that a growing trend is the 
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expression of positive results. However, an exaggerated growth might be, as well, the 
expression of an excessive risk to the bank, thus, this explaining the positive sign of 
the coefficient for our model results. 
Regarding the capital adequacy ratio, the coefficient was positive and, thus, not in 
the line with the expectations as it was assumed that the higher the ratio the more 
reliable the bank is considered to be. However, the coefficient is statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.000. An explanation against the positive sign can be 
the limited information that depositors hold on the performance of the bank in which 
they hold their deposits. Moreover, the results suggest that depositors pay more 
attention to the interest rate, debt ratio, bank size, and earnings, therefore, not being 
sensitive to the bank shareholder’s equity to total assets ratio. This result is consistent 
with the previous findings in Simorangkir (2011) paper on the determinants of bank 
runs in Indonesia where the CA also did not play an important role in depositors’ 
behavior compared to other indicators of financial performance as ROA, NPL that 
showed a high significance. 
Measure of bank size is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. These 
results suggest that larger banks experience a lower probability of bank run as they 
enjoy depositors’ confidence. Thus, the probability of bank run is lower for the “too-
big-to fail” banks. This result is consistent with the previous findings of Graeve and 
Karas (2008), Chernykh and Cole (2011), Gunsel (2008), and Duffoo (2004). 
 Macroeconomic Characteristics 
The findings suggest that inflation rate indicator has positive parameter estimates, 
and is statistically significant at 1% level, thus, indicating that an increase in inflation 
is associated with the bank runs exposure. The increase in inflation has a negative 
impact on interest rates, which in turn increase the cost of funds to the debtor. As a 
consequence this may lead to the expansion of non-performing loans, decrease in 
deposit attractiveness, and leave Russian banking system more vulnerable to a bank 
run. These results agree with the obtained by Simorangkir (2011), Gunsel (2008), 
Heffernan (2003), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). 
The results for the GDP growth rate in our model appear to be contrary to the 
expectation in empirical literature. According to the results from our model, bank 
runs are not sensitive to GDP growth rate due to coefficients having a positive sign 
but still being statistically significant. Following the literature, we would expect that 
a declining GDP growth rate, succeeded by a reduction in economic activity would 
increase the credit risk and probability of default on loans, thus leading banking 
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system to distress. However, the conflicting sign of coefficients in our case might 
suggest that changes in deposits were not sensitive to GDP growth for Russian case. 
These results are consistent with the previous findings of Heffernan (2003) who used 
real GDP growth rate together with other macroeconomic variables to test for 
significance against bank failures in a group of European banks. In Hefferman’s case, 
as well, the coefficients on all the variables had the expected sign except for real GDP 
growth rate. 
Regarding the real interest rate, our findings suggest the lagRDIR variable is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. It was hard to predict the interest rate 
influence on our dependent variable as from one point of view it is expected that an 
increase in the interest rate on deposits would attract Russian depositors to invest 
their money in that banks, while on the other hand, what in short run may lead to an 
increase of deposits in long run may increase the probability of failure of the bank as 
attracted deposits may be used as a source of funding for risky investments. Thus, it 
is highly probable that a bank with sharply increasing interest rate that invested in 
risky investments may fail to pay the customers’ deposits plus interest in the end, fact 
that would lead to a bank run. These results are in agreement with the research 
conducted by Gunsel (2008), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002) 
researches. For example, Gunsel’s findings support the view that an increase in the 
real interest rate in the past increased bank fragility in North Cyprus during 1984-
2002. In the model run by us the interest rate variable is positive and statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.000. 
Exchange rate variables also significantly influence bank runs. The variables 
RUB_USD and RUB_EUR were separated when running the models in order to 
avoid multicollinearity. It was observed that exchange rates are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. Thus, devaluation of ruble may lead 
to a massive withdrawal of deposits by the customers. It is worth to mention that over 
80% of household deposits are local currency deposits. Till 2008, the ruble showed a 
long-term appreciation, which encouraged accumulation of local currency deposits. 
However, after Russia was affected in 2008 by global financial crises, the ruble lost 
around 30% of its value in some months. The ruble is significantly influenced by oil 
and gas prices on the global market, and thus, the depositors face two risks on losing 
their money: inflation and uncertainties in the ruble. As a consequence a fall in ruble, 
showed by the positive sign of the coefficient in our four models, can determine the 
customer to run on the bank. This result is consistent with the previous findings of 
Gunsel (2008), Duffoo (2004), and Heffernan (2003). 
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Based on the above results, we can conclude that Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, 
stating that weak bank-fundamental factors / weak macroeconomic conditions may 
lead to the withdrawal of depositors from that bank, hence, causing a bank run 
phenomena, hold. 
 Institutional Variables 
Apart, our objective is to test for the importance of the deposit insurance 
implementation (Hypothesis 3), classified as an institutional variable in our model. 
According to the results, there is a negative correlation between deposit insurance and 
bank runs. This is indicated by the negative sign and significant coefficients the DIS 
dummy received in all four models we run. The findings suggest that Russian 
banking industry benefited from the introduction of the deposit insurance system, and 
thus lowered the probability of bank runs. Based on the revealed results, we can 
conclude that Hypothesis 3, deposit insurance implementation helps avoid exposure 
to bank runs, holds. This investigation is consistent with Graeve and Karas (2008) 
results, where authors demonstrated that during 1999-2007 Russian non-insured 
banks experienced a drain in deposits, while insured banks did not suffer large 
deposit outflow. Moreover, the author state that insured group of banks experienced a 
deposit inflow.  
Additional evidence supporting the credibility of Russian depositors in the 
insurance mechanism represents the Sberbank credibility – the only bank before 2004 
with a full state guarantee – reason that permitted to this state bank to enjoy consumer 
confidence for a long period of time. Moreover, with the DIS implementation by the 
majority of banks, the state bank still maintains its leadership position. This 
credibility is also reflected in our results on the ownership and demographic 
dummies. The negative sign of the ownership dummy in our models stress that state-
controlled banks dominate on the market, having a higher confidence from 
consumers than private banks have (see Table 13). 
On the other hand, there is also interesting to mention that when comparing 
domestic banks with foreign banks, the positive correlation of demographic dummy 
with our dependent variable demonstrates that Russian customers trust more to invest 
their money into a domestic bank than a foreign one. However, this factor may be 
interpreted from another point of view that some foreign banks’ main activity in 
Russia is not in attracting deposits, but rather serving a single company or large 
corporation. Still, there are foreign bank with a high performance in Russia is 
considered Raiffeisen Bank, which holds on the fifth place in 2012 Interfax ratings on 
household deposits amounts.  Other competitive foreign banks operating in Russia 
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are UniCredit Bank, Rosbank (Société Générale Group), Citibank, and Deutsche 
Bank. 
Finally, in order to assess the quality of the model, we will analyze a group of 
Model Statistics presented in Table 13. 
The overall measure of how well the model fits is given by the likelihood 
parameters. Table 13 presents a listing of the log likelihoods resulted from our four 
run models. The log likelihood for iteration 0, LL0, is a model with no predictors, 
when there are no explanatory variables in the model - only the constant term is 
included. We are interested in the last log likelihood, reported as LLM, because the 
iteration stops when the model is said to have converged. As we mentioned in chapter 
3, a good model is one that results in a high likelihood of the observed results. 
Consequently, the higher the likelihood function, the higher the probability of 
observing dependent variable values in the sample, thus,  Model 1 and Model 3 
seems to have the most suitable log likelihood ratios in our case.  Also, the log 
likelihood is used in the likelihood ratio chi-square test to check whether all 
regression coefficients β’s are equal to zero versus the alternative that at least one did 
not, similar to the F-test for OLS regressions. The LR chi2 results on our models are 
presented in Table 13. The Model Chi-Square statistic is used to determine if the 
overall model is statistically significant and the Prob > chi2, which for all our four 
models represents 0.000, indicates that all of the specification models are highly 
significant (see Appendix B). 
Regarding the pseudo-R2 results, they cannot be interpreted independently or 
compared across datasets in order to analyze how well the model is explained by the 
independent variables as in the OLS regressions; they are considered to be valid and 
useful in evaluating multiple models predicting the same outcome on the same 
dataset. Thus the value of this ratio will not be taken as a valuable measure of quality 
for our model. 
For our logit regression, we assess the quality of the model based on the 
results of the Model chi-square and the AIC criteria. According to Gunsel (2008), the 
purpose of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is to compare the model with 
different degrees of freedom and eliminate the model specification when irrelevant 
explanatory variables are added into the regression. Therefore, we prefer a model 
with a lower AIC to one with a high AIC. From Table 13, Model 2 and Model 3 are 
selected to be optimal. 
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Other way to assess goodness of fit for logit regressions in stata represents the 
classification tables. This command shows you how many cases were predicted 
correctly and incorrectly, where cases with probabilities ≥ 0.5 are predicted as having 
the event and a negative outcome otherwise. 
Table 14: Classification tables (correctly and incorrectly predicted results of the 
model) 
Model 1         Model 2       
Classified 
True Total   
Classified 
True Total 
D ~D     D ~D   
+ 70 60 130   + 0 11 11 
- 521 801 1322   - 2312 15290 17602 
Total 591 861 1452   Total 2312 15301 17613 
Correctly Classified 59.99%   Correctly Classified 86.81% 
                  
Model 3         Model 4       
Classified 
True Total   
Classified 
True Total 
D ~D     D ~D   
+ 1 6 7   + 8 14 22 
- 732 3232 3964   - 2311 15353 17664 
Total 733 3238 3971   Total 2319 15367 17686 
Correctly Classified 81.42%   Correctly Classified 86.85% 
Source: Author’s computations in Stata 
Note:  entire output, including sensitivity and specificity, see Appendix B;        
The Classification Table 14 shows that, for example, in model 1 we have a total 
of 130 variables classified as 1. For 70 of the observations this corresponds to the true 
value, but for 60 of the observations it does not. We have assigned value 0 to 1322 
observations, which turned out to be correct for 861 of the observations. 
Consequently, in total we correctly classified 59.99% of observations for our first 
model. Thus, from the results of the Classification Table 14, we can conclude that 
from Model 1 we predicted correctly 59.99% of the cases; Model 2 - 86.61% of the 
cases; Model 3 – 81.42% of the cases; Model 4 – 86.85% of the cases. 
Other indices of interest might represent the sensitivity and specificity measures 
that help us measure the performance of our models. At the base of sensitivity 
calculation stays the false negative rate, see classification table. From our four 
models, a higher sensitivity ratio has Model 1 with a proportion of 11.84% of actual 
positives which are correctly identified as such. However, a perfect predictor would 
be a 100% ratio. For specificity the probability is calculated based on the false 
positive rate from classification table, thus, measuring the proportion of negatives 
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which are correctly identified as such. Model 2 has the best specificity ratio, 99.93%. 
The plots of sensitivity and specificity for each of four models as well as their value 
in the classification table see Appendix B. 
Finally, the performance of our models can be as well evaluated by the receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve, a plot of specificity versus sensitivity generated 
by varying the cut point. For ROC the area of interest is under the curve that helps us 
measure the predictive power of the model. The range is 1 for a perfect test and less 
than 0.5 otherwise. To compare the areas under the ROC curve for four different 
models is possible by using the logistic linear predictors and the roccomp command. 
The area under the curve is not significantly different for our four models, see Table 
15. All four have a ROC area around 0.68. 
Table 15: Receiver operating characteristic ratios 
      ROC       Asymptotic Normal 
  Obs   Area   Std.err.   95% Conf. Interval 
Model 1 3137   0.6890   0.0130   0.66349 0.71459 
Model 2 3137   0.6834   0.0129   0.65803 0.70874 
Model 3 3137   0.6834   0.0129   0.65803 0.70874 
Model 4 3137   0.6890   0.0130   0.66349 0.71459 
         Source: Author’s computations in Stata 
From the results of the logistic analysis, we can conclude that our four estimated 
models do not differ significantly in results. However, we would highlight Model 2 
and Model 4 as having one of the best significant estimation coefficients, a high 
goodness-of-fit, significant Prob > chi2 as 0.000. Also, Model 2 has the best AIC 
ratio.  
 
4.3 Discussion on the results 
Based on the results from the logistic regression, we can conclude that the 
estimated model proved the assumptions about our three built hypothesis. From these 
tests, we can conclude that weak bank fundamentals together with fragile 
macroeconomic factors contribute to the bank runs in Russian deposit market, and 
variables as inflation, real interest rate, exchange rate, debt ratio, bank size, ROA are 
important explanatory variables to our model. However, some of the model variables 
as capital adequacy and GDP growth proved to be insignificant and have a 
controversive sign. Also, the deposit insurance influence efficiency in prevention of 
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bank runs is proved through our DIS dummy significance. Additional evidence 
supporting the credibility of insurance mechanism, as well as trust of depositors in 
state banks, is provided by other two dummy variables included in the model, 
ownership and demographic dummies. 
With regards to the model quality, we can affirm that our four models proved a 
high significance with a 0.000 Prob > chi-square and over 86% correctly predicted 
cases according to the classification.  
Figure 9: Percentage of banks in the sample with decrease in deposits over 10% 
for 2005-2011 quarterly 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on sample data 
 
However, when analyzing the percentage of cases whether or not the country’s 
banking system experiences a depositors’ run, defined as 10 percent drop in total 
outstanding deposits during quarter, we did not identify severe bank runs cases. As 
presented in Figure 9, there is a significant drop in the percentage of deposits in last 
quarter of 2008  and 2009 year that confirms our expectations about a run in 2008 
(Globex – Financial Times, 2008). Therefore, we may conclude that our analysis 
identified a partial run for 2008, not of high proportions, estimating around 28% of 
bank sample. Also, it is worth to mention the significant decrease in deposit 
withdrawals for 2011 year. The reason might be a better regulation from the DIS 



























































































































































































All others less than 10% Quarterly decrease of deposits >10% 





The aim of this thesis is to examine the factors behind the decision of depositors 
to withdraw their funds from banks and simultaneously to test the effect of deposit 
insurance on bank runs during 2005-2011 period on Russian banking market. 
Methodologically, we have used a logit econometric model to test our assumptions.  
Based on the existing empirical literature and recent theories of bank runs and 
banking regulation, we have determined the main bank-fundamental factors and 
macroeconomic conditions factors that are important in determining the bank fragility 
against runs as capital adequacy, debt ratio, ROA, bank size, inflation, GDP growth 
rate, exchange rate, and real interest rate. The empirical results confirm that both 
financial and macroeconomic indicators have a high significance in our model. The 
findings suggest that drain in deposits in Russian banks is associated with specific 
factors such as high debt ratio, rising real interest rates, small asset size, as well as 
high inflation, and sharp increases in the real exchange rates (RUB/USD, 
RUB/EUR). Regarding the indicators of financial performance as capital adequacy, 
ROA, as well as GDP growth rate macroeconomic factor, which were not in line with 
expectations due to a conflicting positive sign but still statistical significant for our 
model, we consider the reason of results might be due to limited customer 
information taken from published bank financial statements. 
Another interesting fact is related to the deposit insurance scheme adopted by 
Russia in 2004. In addition to understanding the forces that make depositors to come 
and withdraw their money from bank our research is also focuses on testing on 
Russian depositors’ behavior after the implementation of deposit insurance scheme in 
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Russia. Estimation results of our deposit insurance dummy, created to test our third 
hypothesis, confirms that implementation of insurance mechanism helps avoid 
exposure to bank runs in Russia.  
Finally, we wanted to test if deposit insurance adoption had an impact on the 
changes in the degree of deposit amounts from different types of banks: state-
controlled, foreign-controlled, and private-domestic banks. The newly adopted 
deposit insurance might diminish the comprehended safety by the depositors in the 
state-controlled banks compared with private banks, thus, increasing the amount of 
investments to private banks. However, the findings suggest that state banks still 
maintain their leadership position for depositors’ credibility, a bank run being 
associated more with the private banks than with the state-controlled once. 
With regards to the identification of bank runs cases, our model was designed to 
identify a run in case of a decrease of more than 10 percent in bank deposits per 
quarter. From our sample analysis, during 2005-2011 years a significant drop was 
identified in the 2008 year, quarter 4, when 27.11 percent of the cases were 
recognized as a run on the particular banks; this percentage represents more than 1/3 
of banks from the entire system. As a conclusion, we can state that during the end of 
2008 was identified a run on Russian deposit market, however we would not 
characterize it as a severe run because it did not touch all banks but more as a partial 
one. The findings coincide with the official reports on the financial crisis where 
Russian officials’ state that a major drop began in October, 2008 and continued in 
November–December
9
. During October, 2008 Globex (the first Russian bank to 
experience a sharp run on deposits during the crisis) and dozens of other Russian 
banks have reported a sharp rise in withdrawals and account closures, thus 
confirming our findings. 
Overall, we can conclude that the estimated logit econometric model proved a 
high significance with a 0.000 Prob > chi-square and over 86% correctly predicted 
cases according to the classification. The method can contribute to a better 
understanding by regulators, policy makers, and bank supervisors of bank runs 
phenomena and the factors that can influence its inception in order to prevent the 
                                                 
9
 Russia confirms recession to come. BBC News. December, 2008 
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future bank failures. However, we do not exclude possible extensions on the topic. 
For further investigation, we might focus on increasing the time period of sample 
(available data before DIS implementation would be of great value); add more 
financial variables as non-performing loans, interest rates per bank; also, contrast the 
episodes of runs from perspective of deposit drains versus perspective of changing 
the deposits from an insolvent bank or uninsured bank to a solvent or insured one. 
The model, obtained results, and interpretation were based on my understanding of 
the model and knowledge background and a further research is more than welcome. 
 
 




Allen, F., Gale, D. (1998) Optimal Financial Crises, Journal of Finance, American 
Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pp. 1245-1284 
Baltagi, B. H. (2008) Econometrics, 4th Edition, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 
Barnard, G., Thomsen, P. (2002) Financial Sector Reform in Russia: Recent 
Experiences, Priorities, and Impact on Economic Growth and Stability, Background 
paper for presentation at a Conference on the Russian Banking Sector organized by 
the Adam Smith Institute, December 3-4, London. 
Berger, A.N., Turk-Ariss, R. (2011) Do depositors discipline banks? an 
international perspective," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Issue 
May, pp. 89-103. 
Calomiris, C.W., Gorton, G. (1991) The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, 
and Bank Regulation. Dalam R. G. Hubbard, Financial markets and Financial Crisis. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 109-173 
Calomiris, C., Mason, J. (2003) Fundamentals, Panics and Bank Distress during the 
Depresion, American Economic Review 93, pp. 1615-1647 
Camara, M. K., Montes-Negret, F. (2006) Deposit Insurance and Banking Reform 
in Russia, World Bank, Washington, DC, USA 
Chernykh, L., Cole, A. R. (2011) Does deposit insurance improve financial 
intermediation? Evidence from the Russian Experiment, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 35, p. 388-402 
Chari, V., Jagannathan, R. (1988) Banking Panics, Information, and Rational 
Expectations Equilibrium, Journal of Finance 43, pp. 749-761 
  56 
Chowdhury, A. (2003) Banking reform in Russia: Winds of change? Bank of 
Finaland, Institute for Economies in Transition, (BOFIT) Online, No. 5 
Cooper, R., Ross, T.W. (2002) Bank Runs: Deposit Insurance and Capital 
Requirements, International Economic Review, Volume 43, Issue 1, pp. 55–72 
Cull, R., Senbet, L., Sorge, M. (2005) Deposit insurance and financial development, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37, pp.43-82 
Cull, R., Senbet, L., Sorge, M. (2002) The effect of deposit insurance on financial 
depth: A cross-country analysis, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 
Elsevier, Vol. 42(4), pp. 673-694 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E. (1998) The Determinants of Banking Crises in 
Developing and Developed Countries, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 81-109. 
Demirgüc-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E. (2002) Does Deposit insurance Increase 
Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation, IMF Working Paper No 
WP/00/03 
Demirgüc-Kunt A., Huizinga H. (2004) Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, No 51, pp. 375–399 
Demirgüc-Kunt A., Kane E. J. (2002) Deposit Insurance around the Globe: Where 
Does It Work? Journal of Economic Perspectives 02/2002, Vol. 16(2), pp. 175-195 
Diamond, D.W., Dybvig P.H. (1983) Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 
Journal of Political Economy 91: pp. 401-419 
Domaç, I., Peria, M. S. M. (2003) Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, 
October Vol. 61(1), pp. 41-72 
Duffoo, Marco A. Arena (2004) Bank Fundamentals, Bank Failures and Market 
Discipline: An Empirical Analysis for Emerging Markets during the Nineties, 
University of Maryland, College Park publication 
Friedman, M., Schwartz, A. J. (1963) A Monetay History of the United States, 
1867-1960. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1963 
Gangopadhyay, G., Singh, G. (2000) Avoiding bank runs in transition economies: 
The role of risk neutral capital, Journal of Banking and Finance, 24 pp. 625-642 
  57 
Gorshkov, V. (2012) Foreign banking in Russia: activity of foreign banks and 
Russian banks’ foreign expansion, Kyoto University 
Graeve, de F., Karas, A. (2008) Information Based Bank Runs or Panics?, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, TX, USA 
Graeve, de F. and A. Karas (2010) Identifying VARs through Heterogeneity: An 
Application to Bank Runs, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper No. 244 
Gropp R., Vesala, J. (2001) Deposit insurance and moral hazard: Does the 
counterfactual matter? Working Paper No 47, European Central Bank 
Gunsel, N. (2008) Micro and Macro Determinants of Bank Fragility in North Cyprus 
Economy, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 22 (2008) 
Heffernan, S.A. (2003) The Causes of Bank Failures, in Mullineux W. and Murinde 
V. Handbook of Interational Banking, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 366-402 
Ioannidou, V., Dreu, I. de (2006) The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on 
Market Discipline, DNB Working Papers 089, Netherlands Central Bank, Research 
Department. 
Iyer, R., Puri, M. (2008) Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-
Bank Relationships and Networks, NBER Working Paper No. 14280 
Ippolito, F. (2002) The Banking Sector Rescue in Russia, Bank of Finland, Institute 
for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) Online, No. 12 
Kam Hon Chu (2011) Deposit Insurance and Banking Stability, Cato Journal, Vol. 
31, No. 1 (Winter 2011) 
Karas, A., Schoors, K., Weill, L. (2008) Are private banks more efficient than 
public banks? Evidence from Russia, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in 
Transition, BOFIT Discussion Papers, No. 2 
Karels, G., McClatchey, C. (1999) Deposit Insurance and Risk-Taking behavior in 
the Credit Union Industry, Journal of Banking and Finance, 23, pp. 105-134 
Kaufman, G.G. (1988) Bank Runs: causes, benefits and costs, Cato Journal, Vol. 7, 
No. 3 (Winter 1988) 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1978) Manias, Panics and Crashes, Basic Books, New York, 
1978. 
  58 
Kraft, E., Galac, T. (2007) Deposit interest rates, asset risk and bank failure in 
Croatia, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 2, Issue 4, March 2007, pp. 312–336 
Laeven, L. (2002) Bank risk and deposit insurance, World Bank Economic Review, 
16, pp. 109-137 
Lanine, G., Vennet, R.V. (2005) Failure prediction in the Russian bank sector with 
logit and trait recognition models, Ghent University Working Paper, Belgium 
Maddala, G. S. (2001) Introduction to Econometrics. Wiley 
Majer, I. (2010): Application Scoring: logit model approach and the divergence 
method compared, Department of Applied Econometrics Working Paper No. 10-06 
McCulloch J.H., Yu, Min-Teh (1998) Government Deposit Insurance and the 
Diamond-Dybvig Model, The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave 
Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pp.139-149 
Neuberger, J.A. (1991) Depositor Discipline and Bank Runs, Research Department: 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco publication 
Samartin, M. (2002) Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance: A 
Welfare Comparison, European Finance Review, 2002, Vol. 6, No 2, pp. 223-244 
Semenova, M. (2007) How depositors discipline banks. The case of Russia, 
Economic Education and Research Consortium Working Paper Series ISSN 156-
2422, No 07/02 
Simorangkir, I. (2011) Determinant of Bank Runs In Indonesia: Bad Luck or 
Fundamental? , Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol 14, No 1,  
Solntsev, O.G., Mamonov, M.E., Pestova, A.A., Magomedova, Z.M. (2012) 
Experience in Developing Early Warning System for Financial Crises and the 
Forecast of Russian Banking Sector Dynamics in 2012, CMASF – Center for 
Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, Moscow 
Tompson, W. (2004) Banking reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects, OECD, 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 410, ECO/WKP (2004)33 
Vernikov, A. (2011) Government Banking in Russia: Magnitude and New Features, 
IWH Discussion Papers 13, Halle Institute for Economic Research 
  59 
Zhu, H. (2001) Bank Runs, Welfare, and Policy Implications, BIS Working Papers 
No. 107, Bank for International Settlements 
World Bank (2002) Building Trust: Developing the Russian Financial Sector, 
Washington, DC, USA 
Review of the Banking Sector of the Russian Federation (2011), The Central Bank 
of the Russian Federation publication 
The Moscow News No. 42 (2012) Russia: A Bank Run and Fears of a Repeat 
The Statistical database of Interfax /Interfax-100. Russian Banks 
An Introduction to Logistic Regression, Appalachian State University 









  60 
Appendix A 
Appendix A 
Russian Banking Sector 
 Figure 10: Interest rates dynamics for deposits with term higher than 1 year 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on DIA data. 
Figure 11: Changes in the GDP, Inflation, and M2 during 2006-2011 
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Table A.1 General overview on the Russian banking sector 
 
Table 16:  General overview on the Russian banking sector 
 
            
Source: Central Bank of Russia, State Corporation - Deposit Insurance Ag
Data as at start of period (01.01) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of credit organizations 2124 2001 1826 1666 1516 1409 1345 1296 1228 1178 1146 
with banking license 1311 1319 1329 1329 1299 1253 1189 1136 1108 1058 1012 
license to attract private deposits 1239 1223 1202 1190 1165 1045 921 906 886 849 819 
license to conduct foreign currency operations 764 810 829 845 839 827 803 754 736 701 677 
general license 244 262 293 310 311 301 287 300 298 291 283 
license for operations with precious metals 163 171 175 181 182 184 192 199 203 203 208 
Foreign credit organizations with banking license 130 126 126 128 131 136 153 202 221 226 220 
fully foreign owned 22 23 27 32 33 41 52 63 76 82 80 
50 to 100% foreign owned 11 12 10 9 9 11 13 23 26 26 31 
Included in the register of banks participating in 
the DIS 
- - - - 739 930 924 909 893 859 832 
Total number of branches of existing credit 
organizations 
3793 3433 3326 3219 3238 3295 3281 3455 3470 3183 2926 
of which branches of Sberbank 1529 1233 1162 1045 1011 1009 859 809 775 645 574 
of which branches of fully foreign owned banks 7 9 12 15 16 29 90 169 242 241 203 
Total banking sector assets as % of GDP n/a 35.3 38.3 42.3 41.7 44.8 51.9 60.5 67.9 75.9 76 
Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP 16.8 18.0 21.2 24.3 27.5 32.5 38.8 42.2 46.2 44.9 46.8 
Deposit interest rate (%) 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 6 9 6 n/a 
Lending interest rate (%) 18 16 13 11 11 10 10 12 115 11 9 
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Model 4: 
 
Significance summary statistics: 
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Classification table –model 1: 
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Classification table –model 3: 
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Figure 12: Sensitivity calculation for Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 
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Figure 13: Specificity calculation for Model 1, 2, 3, and 4 
                           
                        
